conjectured that any matching can be transformed to some stable matching by a sequence of b-interchanges. Given a matching M and a blocking pair (m, w) for M, a b-interchange for M by (m, w) is defined as a transformation from M to a matching obtained by replacing two pairs (m, pM(m)) and (pM(w), w) in M with (m, w) and (pM(w), pM(m)). In this paper, we give a counter-example in which some matching cannot be transformed to any stable matching by b-interchanges. However, any matching can be transformed to some stable matching by using b-interchanges and identifying special cycling. We also give an algorithm to find either such cycling or a stable matching.
INTRODUCTION
In an instance of the stable marriage problem of size n, each of n men and n women has a list of all members, called a preference list, of the opposite sex in the order of preference. Person p prefers q to r if and only if q precedes r on p's preference list, which we write as q <p r. If either q = r or q <p r then we write q ~<p r. A matching is a set of n disjoint couples of men and women. If man m and woman w are coupled in a matching M, then m and w are called partners in M, which we write as either m = pM(w), w = pM(m), or (m, w)~ M according to convenience. Man m and woman w are said to be a blocking pair for a matching M if w <m pM(m) and m <w pM(w). If there is no blocking pair for M then the matching M is called stable. For a given stable marriage instance of size n, the divorce digraph is defined as follows. The node set of this digraph is the set of n! matchings. The digraph has a directed edge from a matching M to a matching M' if and only if there is a blocking pair (m, w) for M such that M' is obtained from M by replacing (m, pM(m)) and (pM(w), w) with (m, w) and (pM(w), p~(m)). We call such a replacement arising from a blocking pair (m, w) a b-interchange by (m, w), and we denote M' by binter (M, m, w) .
Gale and Shapley [1] proved that there exists at least one stable matching for any stable marriage instance. From the result, there is at least one sink in any divorce digraph. In a book of it is conjectured that there is a path from each node to a sink in the divorce digraph, in other words, any matching can be transformed to some stable matching by a sequence of b-interchanges (see also Gusfield and Irving [-2] ). In Section 2, we provide a counter-example in which some matching cannot be transformed to any stable matching by b-interchanges. In fact if size n/> 4, one can always find such an instance. However, any matching can be transformed to some stable matching by using b-interchanges and identifying a special cycle in the divorce digraph. In Section 3, we give an algorithm to find either such a cycle or a stable matching. Fig. 1 ). In this section indices i-2, i-1, i+ 1, i+ 2, etc., are taken modulo n. Let J(n) denote such an instance of size n. We will prove that J(n) is a counter-example for Knuth's conjecture.
In the section we consider matchings M such that pM(mi)=k(me) for some k = 1, 2, 3, 4, for each man mi. Let shift(M) denote the set of n couples in which mi+ l's partner is wj+ 1 if pM(mi) = w s for i = 0, 1, ..., n - Proof We consider a matching mo= {(mo, W0), (ml, W1), ..., (m,_3, w,_3), (m, 2, w, 1), (m,_l, wn_2)}. The divorce digraph of J(4).
ALGORITHM FOR FINDING A STABLE MATCHING FROM A MATCHING
This section provides an algorithm which we call a b-interchange algorithm, for finding either a directed path from a given matching Mo to some stable matching or a cycle in the divorce digraph. A cycle is defined as a Given a matching M and a blocking pair (m, w) for M, we say that pairs (m, w) and (pM(w), pM(m)) are happy and unhappy in the matching binter(M, m, w), respectively, in the sense that unhappy persons were deserted by their partners and happy persons get better partners. It is also possible that an unhappy person gets a better partner. We call the pair defined in Step 1 unhappy for convenience. Informally, the b-interchange algorithm may be expressed as a sequence of b-interchanges determined by unhappy persons. At any point during the execution of Step 2, either an unhappy man rhi or woman 1~ i in a current matching M/determines the next blocking pair ( 
nh~, bbpM,(rh~)) or (bbpM,(~), ~). If bbp~,(rh,)~nil
and bbpM,(~)~nil, then the algorithm has a flexible choice between (rh~, bbp~(rh~)) and (bbpM~(~i), ~i); however, there is no problem either way. We say that such blocking pairs determined by an unhappy man and woman are man-oriented and woman-oriented, respectively, if they exist. If such a blocking pair exists then a new matching M~+ 1 is obtained by the b-interchange with the blocking pair. We call a b-interchange determined by a man-oriented (women-oriented) blocking pair a man-oriented (womanoriented) b-interchange. We note when the matching M~+I is obtained by a man-oriented b-interchange, the happy man is satisfied with the matching in the sense that there is no blocking pair containing him. Although the happy woman has a better partner, she may not be satisfied with the matching in the above sense. The same holds when M~÷~ is obtained by a woman-oriented b-interchange. The execution of Step 2 terminates when either a cycle is found or bbpMi(rhi)= bbpMi(#~)= nil.
We first prove that Step 2 of the b-interchange algorithm reduces the number of blocking pairs if it find no cycle in the divorce digraph. Let Ms be a matching just before the execution of the while statement in Step 2 and let M~ be a matching just after the execution. For a matching Mk (k = s, ..., t) at any point during the execution, the following lemma holds. LEMMA 3.1. Let (m, w) be a pair satisfying at least one of the following conditions: (1) m or w is unhappy, (2) (m, w) is not a blocking pair, (1) or (2)for Mk.
Proof We will prove the assertion by induction on k. Assume that condition (1) To complete the proof we consider the case when condition (2) holds for Mk but (1) We next consider the case when the b-interchange algorithm outputs a cycle C. In the rest of this section, we suppose that the cycle is defined as C= { (Mr, mr, w,) .... , (mn-1, mn 1, Wn 1), (M~, mn, w,) }.
We will show that one can obtain a matching M such that bp(M) ~ bp(Ms) by using the cycle C. Since men and women are symmetric, we will only prove assertions for men in the lemmas below.
Let Cm and Cw denote the sets of men and women whose partners are interchanged during the cycle C, respectively. Then the following lemma holds. Proof Assume on the contrary that there exist two men ml, m2~ Cm with bbpc(ml)= bbpc(m2)= w. In addition, we suppose the following:
(1) Let the cycle C consist of matchings M 1 ..... Mk;
(2) ml <w m2 (w likes ml better than m2); (3) j=min{i~ [1, k-1] fMi is obtained by a b-interchange with (mz, w)}; (4) (ml, w)~M1 and (ml, w)¢Mifor i=2,...,j-1.
From assumption (4), w is happy or unhappy in M2. Since bbpc(ma)= w, w must marry happily. Then w has a partner in M2 whom she prefers to m~ and hence to m2 also from assumption (2) . Since w and m 2 marry happily in Mj, she must be unhappy in some matching M~ (i= 3 ..... j-1). Let h be the maximum in {3 .... ,j-l} such that wis unhappy in Mh. Since (m~, w)¢Mh, m~ is not unhappy in Mh. From Lemma 3.4, W<ml P~ch(ml) holds. Then w has a partner in Mh+l whom she prefers to ml since Mh+ ~ is initiated by w from the maximality of h. From the definitions of h and j, w prefers her partner in Mj, namely m2, to m~. This is a contradiction. | For a cycle C found by the the b-interchange algorithm, let M E be the set of man-woman pairs defined by
The set M~ of man-woman pairs can be defined similarly. 
bbpc(#), ~) is a man-oriented blocking pair for Mj if Mj+l is obtained by a b-interchange with (bbpc(#), ~).
Proof First we show that if w is not unhappy in a matching then her partner in the matching is either m or a man whom she prefers to m. Assume that w is unhappy in a matching Mk and marries happily in Mk+l. If m is also unhappy in Mk, then w has a partner in Mk+l whom she prefers to m. Suppose that m is not unhappy in the matching Mk. From Lemma 3.4, m prefers w=bbpc(m) to pMk(m). Then w's partner in Mk+l is either m or a man whom she prefers to m. After k + 1, whenever w is not unhappy, her partner is either m or a man whom she prefers to m.
From the above fact, w must be unhappy in M~ because otherwise (m, w) does not block M~. I
We remark, from the proof of Lemma 3.6, that m~ C m is the worst partner for bbpc(m) among the set {mil(mi, bbpc(m)) is a man-or woman-oriented blocking pair during the cycle C} and that w e Cw is the worst for bbpc(w). EXAMPLE. We apply the b-interchange algorithm to the instance J(4) in Fig. 4 . Let M2 = {(mo, Wo), (ml, wl), (m2, w3), (m3, w2)} be an input matching and let (m3, Wo) be the initial blocking pair. Then the algorithm outputs a cycle C = { (M2, m3, Wo), (M16, m2, w2), (M22, mo, wl), (ma2, m3, w3), (m7, m l, w2), (M9, too, Wo), (M3, m2, w3), (m4, ml, wl), (M2, m3, Wo)}.
Any matching in this cycle cannot be transformed to any one of the five stable matchings (see Fig. 6 ). However, from the cycle C, one can construct two matcbings M E = {(mo, Wo), (ml, wl), (m2, w2), (m3, W3)} M~= {(mo, wl), (ma, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, Wo)}. Remarks. It is not certain whether our algorithm for transforming a given matching to some stable matching terminates in polynomial time. From Lemma3.3, the length k-1 of a cycle C=(Ml,ml,wl),..., (Mk, ink, wk) is at least 2 x [Cml = 2 x ICwh. However, there is an indication that the length equals 2 x [C~l by our experiments for small stable marriage instances.
